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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
BRADLEY C. DAVIS and 
HOLLY H. HYATT, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 960271-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Appellant Davis was on probation for a misdemeanor 
theft in Kane County; Appellant Hyatt was not on probation, nor 
had she been suspect of illegal conduct. Because an officer, one 
night, witnesses Appellant Davis run into a man at a truck stop, 
who the day earlier was arrested for possession of a drug 
paraphernalia, the appellant's probation officer and other agents 
conducted a search of the couples1 home and vehicles. The agents 
lacked a reasonable facts to suspect that the appellants1 were 
committing a public offense. Nonetheless, the agents do find 
small amounts of drugs and the appellants were subsequently 
charged with possession with intent to distribute. 
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 
24 (c), the appellants hereby reply to the Appellee's new matters 
set forth as follows: 
POINT I. 
DE NOVO REVIEW FOR CORRECTNESS CANNOT SUPPORT 
THE SEARCH; THE SEARCH LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION 
Even though the appellee states the correct standard of 
review for which this court must consider this matter. The State 
attempts to oppose this appeal by arguing that the appellants 
must show and overcome a standard of abuse of discretion with 
regards to the trial court's denial of their pretrial Motion to 
Suppress. The appellee is wrong, the Appellants do not have to 
show that the trial exceeded its discretion, but rather this 
Court reviews this matter de novo, according no deference to the 
trial court. 
On de novo review, the appellants rely raise one fact 
for this Court consideration. The only articulable fact that is 
not irrelevant nor stale to this matter is Appellant Davis1 
association with Mr. Blackburn—who was previous to this date 
cited for possession of a drug paraphernalia. However, this 
Court reiterated in State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (1991), that the 
mere propinquity of others is not sufficient evidence to support 
a suspicion of criminal wrong doing. 
In defense of this position, the Appellee argues that 
there was a total of eight facts which the agents relied on 
creating their supposed reasonable suspicion. Note: The State 
does not deny the fact that it was the officerfs observation at 
the truck stop which initiated the search, the State's inclusion 
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of the seven other facts are to attempt circumvent the "mere 
propinquity" standard set by this Court. 
By the numbers, the analysis of the State1s alleged 
facts are as follows: 
Alleged Fact No, 1 
[S]ix days prior to the search, Davis had already violated 
the terms of his probation by possessing drug paraphernalia, 
possessing a firearm and [admitting to] using marijuana and 
methamphetamine. 
(R. at 822-(67)). 
This may be true, if indeed the agents of Adult Probation and 
Parole had felt that this circumstance gave rise to action on 
their part they should have acted then. Either a search or a 
motion for a show cause hearing would have been appropriate at 
that time. The agents waived any right to act on this by 
deciding not to take action. Hence, six days later, the 
information was stale and could not have been the basis for a 
search some time later. 
Alleged Fact No. 2 
[T]he evening prior to the search, police officers [in 
Washington County] arrested Milby for possessing 
methamphetamine, and cited Blackburn for possessing drug 
paraphernalia. 
(R. at 822-(13-14, 2-23)). 
This information even taken in the light most favorable to the 
State proves nothing against the appellants. Moreover, the 
conduct of these two are irrelevant to these proceedings. The 
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parties, Milby and Blackburn, are entitled to the presumption of 
innocence until proven guilty, the disposition of those two 
proceedings are unknown and irrelevant to these proceedings. 
Alleged Fact No. 3 
[T]he arrest triggered an investigation of Milby for 
possible poaching and further drug activity. 
(R. at 822-(22)). 
This information even taken in the light most favorable to the 
State proves nothing against Davis and Hyatt. This investigation 
is clearly irrelevant to the appellants. 
Alleged Fact No. 4 
Milby was a known drug user and possibly a drug dealer. 
(R. at n/a). 
This information is speculative at best. While it appears valid 
that Milby was arrested for possession of Methamphetamine, it is 
not shown that this information is generally known, and or that 
the information made Milby a "known criminal". Further there is 
no connection between the appellants and Milby. Furthermore, the 
State fails to cite to the record regarding this alleged fact. 
Alleged Fact No. 5 
[0]nly a few hours after Milby1s arrest and in the course of 
the investigation of him, a police officer saw Davis 
approaching Milby1s house at 2:00 a.m. 
(R. at 393). 
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This information even taken in the light most favorable to the 
State proves nothing against the appellants. 
Alleged Fact No, 6 
[A]t that time, Blackburn's truck was parked outside of 
Milby's house with the engine running, and all of the lights 
were on in Milby's house. 
(R. at 392, 822-(23-24)). 
This information even taken in the light most favorable to the 
state proves nothing against the appellants. 
Alleged Fact No. 7 
Davis started to pull in to Milbyfs driveway, then turned 
and accelerated away from the home when he saw a police 
officer watching it. 
(R. at 393, 822-(24)). 
This information even taken in the light most favorable to the 
state proves nothing against the appellants. 
Alleged Fact No.8 
[T]he police officer saw Davis meet Blackburn at a truck 
stop a shortly [sic] after Davis had aborted his visit to 
Milby!s house. 
(R. at 822-(26) & 822-(38-40)). 
What the police officer actually observed was that Davis went to 
the truck stop and then independently of any of the above 
enumerated events, Blackburn goes to the same truck stop. Then 
while at the truck stop, there is no actual contact made between 
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the two men, not even a hand shake. (R. at 822 (26, 38-40)). 
Under the totality of the circumstances, a review of 
these facts indicates other more logical inferences of innocent 
behavior. Davis and Blackburn had planned to meet at the truck 
stop for what ever reason, breakfast, coffee, conversation, etc, 
(r. at 822-(39-40),) . . . Davis was on his way to the truck 
stop, but detoured first to see if Blackburn had left Milby1s 
residence yet. When Davis drove by and saw Blackburn's truck 
warming up, he decided to move on directly to the Sunshine Truck 
Stop, as Blackburn would be following shortly. Thus, all of 
these facts in this matter do not depart from Munsen, rather they 
support the decision of Munsen. The officer did not observe 
anything illegal about the two individuals. He did not see them 
exchange anything, not even a hand shake. Moreover, the officer 
looked into the back of Blackburn's pick up to find only clean, 
white snow. (R. at 822-(39-40)). 
The appelleefs version of the events that took place 
that evening, sound much like paranoia. The State would like 
this court to adopt its contention that Davis "pulled away from 
the house when he noticed a police officer watching him" and this 
suggests that "he had a less innocent reason for his visit." 
See, Br. of Appellee at 16. Why didnft Davis race home then in 
fear when he saw the officer? Why didnft Davis run to the 
nearest telephone and give the alarm to Milby or Blackburn? How 
did Blackburn know to meet Davis at the truck stop? Why didnft 
Davis "abort" the meeting with Blackburn at the truck stop after 
the officer approached Davis with his questions? Either Davis 
was overconfident or just plain innocent. 
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The facts suggest that Davis wasn!t concerned about the 
officer encounter because, evidently, Davis didn't feel any 
threatened by the officer encounter implicitly because he wasn't 
involved in any criminal activity. Remember, six days prior 
Davis admitted some use of drugs, and logically he should have no 
longer been involved in any drug activity. Why would he 
continue? Why wouldn't it be reasonable for officers to believe 
that any suspicion wouldnft be stale now? Furthermore, remember, 
that an individual's desire to avoid a level one encounter cannot 
be used against the individual to create reasonable suspicion. 
Whether taken individually or collectively, there is no 
indication that Davis was violating any condition of his 
probation at the time of the search, November 21, 1994. There 
was no reasonable suspicion that Davis was violating his 
probation at the time of the search, November 21, 1994. 
The State has mustered all the facts it could to 
support it's position, no matter how irrational some of the facts 
may be. The State relies a lot on speculation and fill-in-the-
blanks to justify the search and defend this appeal. 
Collectively these facts may have given rise of concern to a 
probation officer; however, there was not sufficient articulable 
facts to create a reasonable suspicion that Davis was violating 
his probation or to justify the search on November 21, 1994. 
POINT II. 
STATE V. JOHNSON IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM STATE V. HYATT. 
The State further argues that Ms. Hyatt had voluntarily 
surrendered some or all of her expectation of privacy because she 
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lived with Mr. Davis. The only way this search and the fruits 
thereof could be used against Ms. Hyatt is if she had a lessened 
expectation of privacy. This is because there certainly were not 
sufficient facts to form a basis for "probable cause" to get a 
search warrant issued. The case cited by the State (State v. 
Johnson, 748 P.2d at 1073-74) for which they hold that the level 
of expectation of privacy of the co-tenant is diminished is 
distinguishable. In Johnson, it was the person on probation that 
attempted to use the expectation of privacy of a co-tenant to 
expand his constitutional protections. In this case, Ms. Hyatt 
asserts this protection on her own behalf. There has been no 
challenge to Ms. Hyattfs standing to challenge the search. In 
Johnson, the mother lacked standing to challenge the search, 
this is clearly not the case in this matter. 
POINT III. 
THE SOLE CONCLUSION THAT THE PROPERTY WAS STOLEN DOES NOT 
RELIEVE THE STATE OF THE BURDEN TO PROVE DAVIS KNEW 
THE ITEMS TO BE STOLEN. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-501, states: 
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against 
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of 
such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
Id. In this case, the State argues that the jury could only 
conclude that the property was stolen. This of course is an 
assumption that there were no other reasonable alternatives as to 
the disposition of the property. The requirement placed upon the 
State was to show that the property was received by an individual 
knowing that it had been stolen. 
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While the State argues that after hearing the testimony 
of the witnesses the jury had no alternative to conclude that the 
property was stolen, it was also very evident that there was a 
substantial period between the time when the property was 
supposedly stolen and the time the property was recovered from 
Mr. Davis. (R. at 740-44, 721-30). There was no evidence 
connecting Mr. Davis with the property as to his knowledge that 
the property was stolen. As a matter of fact it was left to the 
jury to conclude that the property was stolen. All of this 
testimony did no go one bit to establish the knowledge of the 
appellant. Thus, the State failed to prove a critical element of 
this charge. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL TIMELY OBJECTED TESTIMONY. 
At the time of trial, counsel for the appellants 
objected to allowing the testimony of both Danny Balduck and 
Blake Bentley. Although the first objection was not on the 
record because the court used the mute button on the bench to 
mute the argument. (R. at 677) It is not the belief of the 
appellants or defense counsel that this was done for any improper 
purpose but rather as a matter of practice by the court. Even 
though, this first objection was referred to by Mr. Burns, when 
he attempted to justify the use of the witnesses by arguing "It's 
also relevant to show lack of mistake, identity, modus operandi -
-." (R. at 702-3, 738-39). The objection was raised and re-
addressed discussing the two individuals testimony. The judge 
allowed the testimony on those grounds and chose to disregard 
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defense counsel's objections. Regarding the testimony of both 
witnesses, defense counsel argued its prejudicial effect 
regarding the Utah Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b). The 
testimony provided did not conform with 404(b). (R. at 677-708). 
The appellants are not raising this argument for the 
first time on appeal, but it was addressed at the time these 
witnesses were offered by the State on the morning of the second 
day of trial. These two witnesses were not even disclosed or 
identified to defense counsel until just prior to the time of 
trial. 
The explanation of what took place at the time of trial 
and in the newspaper as contained at page 18-20 of Appellants' 
brief is to further explain both the intent of the prosecutor, 
what he felt he accomplished (the newspaper article). Clearly 
what he told the judge in response to defense counsel's 
objections to these witnesses and what the impact was on the jury 
were entirely different. With this in mind, the validity of the 
jury's decision is substantially doubted. The Court shouldn't 
find any confidence the jury's verdict based upon the statements 
of the judge and prosecutor at the time of trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellants request this 
Honorable Court to find no merit in the Brief of Appellee. The 
probation officers lacked reasonable suspicion to search Mr. 
Davis and they had no right to search Ms. Hyatt. Out of the 
eight facts that the State relies on to support reasonable 
suspicion, only one is not irrelevant or stale; that is the visit 
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with Mr. Blackburn at the truck stop. However, perceivably other 
innocent activity are certainly presumed and would have been more 
logically drawn therefrom than which was drawn by these officers. 
The propinquity of others who are, have, or may be involved in 
criminal activity reasonable is insufficient to support 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of a probationer. 
Secondly, the prosecution failed to prove that Mr. 
Davis was in possession of stolen goods knowing them to be 
stolen. 
Therefore, this Honorable Court should vacate the 
orders reversing the convictions entered against the appellants. 
Moreover, the appellants should be awarded reasonable attorney 
fees and costs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of 
November, 1997. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 16th 
day of November, 1997, I served a copy of the foregoing REPLY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS upon the counsel for the Appellee in this 
matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient 
postage prepaid to the following address: 
Thomas B. Brunker 
Office of the Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Dated this 16th day of November, 1997. 
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ADDENDA 
Utah Rules of Evidence 403 
Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b) 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as 
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The 
change in language is not one of substance, 
since "surprise" would be within the concept of 
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402 
[Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee Note 
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a contin-
uance in most instances would be a more ap-
propriate method of dealing with "surprise." 
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric 
testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and 
violation of due process). See the following 
Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v. Zions 
Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 
1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 
1982). 
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed refer-
ence to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule 
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and 
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference. 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a). 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in confor-
mity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that 
the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other pur-
poses, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
